On Tuesday, Ed Miliband caused a political earthquake when he upset his brother to claim the UK Labour leadership.
Immediately, the right-wing press found their soundbyte – “Red Ed”.
In his keynote to conference, Ed Miliband immediately rubbished that suggestion. It’s a bit of an insult to call him a “Red” when Labour spent many years trying to boot Communists like Militant Tendency out of the party – let alone the fact that “Red Ken” has been given another shot at becoming Labour’s mayor of London (and even that tag is a bit of a joke these days).
Ed should be called a conventional social democrat, who believes in equality and collectivism and using the power of the state to change society, as opposed to the strong strains of liberalism, neoliberalism and individualism that often ran through New Labour.
The press were obviously trying to label him before he had a chance to define himself. They were also angry about how their preferred candidate, David Miliband, had not won. The howls of outrage grew even bigger when Ed Miliband won via the union vote. What these people failed to understand was that the “union vote” is actually a vote of members of affiliated societies. The union vote isn’t some stack of union secretaries, it’s a vote of ordinary union members – teachers, nurses, cleaners, public servants, manufacturing workers. They also include members of small think tanks like the Fabians and compass, who did break for Ed Miliband as well. The fact Ed Miliband won this section wasn’t an accident. He went after their votes and talked about issues that they cared about. There’s nothing wrong with that.
Perhaps there’s a bigger point to make, though. The attacks on Ed Miliband before he has even spent a week in the job show that many in the media think that “New Labour” is the only credible or electable version of Labour. Anything else is illegitimate or “red”. Perhaps more of a worry – many in “the new Labour establishment” feel exactly the same way.
EdM was absolutely spot on when he called them an “establishment”. To this day, none of that establishment have any idea just how bad some of their policies were to the country and to Labour’s credibility. ”. To me this was brought to life when David Miliband was spotted whispering to Harriet Harman about why she clapped Ed’s condemnation on Iraq. When Ed Miliband told conference that Iraq was wrong, conference gave a half-hearted applause, almost like they were in shock.
When he talked about how Unions fight for justice, and how labour market flexibility was not always the answer, and that marketisation of public services had gone too far, and that the gap between rich and poor was too wide, again the New Labour establishment was shaken up. Part of the New Labour brand was to not worry about these things – but as Ed said in an earlier speech a few weeks ago – “New Labour got stuck in it’s own dogma”.
In Australia we wouldn’t view such opinions as out of place or unfashionable in the ALP. In fact, they would be mainstream even in sections of the NSW right faction. Ed Miliband’s comment that the Iraq War was wrong because it undermined international institutions was precisely the opinion of the ALP in 2003 and it remains so today. Yet in British Labour it remains controversial, because Blair spent an enormous amount of his (and Labour’s) political capital in selling it. To call that decision wrong took an enormous amount of bravery to but Ed was absolutely right to do it.
Ed’s task is to remove the “New” from Labour, and then make “Labour” credible. This will not be easy. It was a task that proved too big for Neil Kinnock. It will be resisted by the political and media establishment.
Part of the problem he has is a problem of Labour’s own making. By branding itself “New Labour” in 1996, the Labour party did two things.
First – the term “New” was an appropriate way of showing people that Labour had changed from the era of strikes, militant tendency and Clause IV. In 1996, it was useful way of wrapping up the changes Labour had made in one brand that was easy for people to understand.
On the other hand, “New Labour” implied that everything about Labour before 1996 was “old” or “bad, or at least “unelectable”. When Ed Miliband criticizes New Labour, it will make it easy for people to say he wants to take Labour backwards.
This is a big problem, but one that he simply must overcome.
The only way he can do it is to outline specifically what he liked about New Labour, what he’s going to chuck in the bin, and then rebuild the vision by adding some things of his own.
In his speech yesterday, he went a surprisingly long way to doing that.
He picked the things that New Labour got right, and outlined most of their first term agenda – the minimum wage, peace in northern Ireland, saving the NHS, fixing public services through increased expenditure, its record on equality for women and gay people, and it’s (then) solid foreign policy agenda, and balancing all this with a stable economy.
Then he trashed the things they got wrong. Flexible Labour markets, tuition fees, trashing civil liberties, housing, immigration, marketisation in public services, banking deregulation and the Iraq War.
Ed Miliband basically argued that Labour was at its best when it implemented things that you’d expect a Labour government to do – and it stuffed up when it strayed too far from its core values. Then they wasted an opportunity during the Brown era to move on and reform the economy.
He also added some of his own vision on top. A graduate tax to replace tuition fees, taxes on the banks, a living wage, changes to basic labour market changes to stop the undercutting of wages, green investments, a defense of unions, and a foreign policy based on values, not alliances.
The press will obviously focus on his deficit reduction plan as being the first hurdle for his leadership. Luckily, some of the work has already been done for him via Alistair Darling’s plan. A good first step would be to stick to that plan as a base, oppose cuts that are likely to harm the poor or sacrifice economic growth, outline tax increases for the rich, and then start hammering the airwaves on what the rest of his policy vision should be.
Ed Miliband above all things is at his best when he speaks with passion and conviction. The speech he gave on Tuesday could not have been delivered by David Miliband. There’s no way he could have repudiated sections of the New Labour policy program with any credibility. It’s not just the policy vision, it’s also the sense of humility, passion, honesty and sympathy, yet delivered with a sturdy and calm backbone. Labour has made a courageous decision to elect him, but I believe they made the right one. He is a clean break – some might say a premature break.
Many in the New Labour establishment will feel a sense of entitlement that has now been taken away from them too early, and they won’t appreciate the critique. But in the long term, the Labour party will be better off for electing him. There would have been little point continuing with a model under David Miliband that had been rejected by the electorate, only to see it rejected again. Even if this experiment ultimately fails, Labour will be better off for doing something different, and it will be better off by having an honest conversation about past failures.
Given the fall of a number of social-democratic governments in Europe, the defeat of NZ Labour, the recent near-death experience of the ALP, and the difficulties president Obama is facing, part of Ed Miliband’s task must be greater. Now that he has begun to dismantle New Labour, he must rebuild what a credible social democracy in the 21st century should look like. He has already told the New Statesman that this is what he wants to do.
The Con-Dem coalition should not underestimate the importance of this. Nor should it be underestimated. Labour has seen a huge amount of members join since the general election – 35,000 in just 4 months. Yesterday Eddie Izzard announced that 2,000 more had joined in the 2 days since Ed Miliband became the leader.
If these people are involved as party members in the party’s organization and the future direction of the party, that will be a huge advantage for Labour. Not only will it create a massive organisational movement that can turn out at election time, it can also help shape the vision. If Labour wants to get back to power quickly, having a growing and vibrant organization will be a huge advantage on the ground.
Figures like Bob Hawke, Bill Clinton, Gerhard Schroeder, Neil Kinnock, Tony Blair, Paul Keating, Helen Clark and David Lange defined social democracy in their own time. Social democratic parties during the 80's and 90's warmly embraced the third way as an alternative to both Thatcherism and socialism – even if that meant compromising traditional beliefs about public services, unions, the role of the state, and equality.
That era of social democracy seems to be ending, with Conservatives on the march through almost every western country with a vision of cuts to the state. The third way vision of Blair has, for the most part, reached the end of its shelf life. It was always going to reach a point where someone drew a line and said "this isn't working" or "this isn't labour". Now that Ed Miliband has done that, a new era must now begin. Obama showed part of the way forward through collective organising, but he has now become stuck in a quagmire in government. From opposition, that vision can be renewed and made fresh again, and the sooner this is done the better it will be, and the sooner Labour will come back to government.
Showing posts with label leadership. Show all posts
Showing posts with label leadership. Show all posts
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Federal Labor - led by a red(head)
The deed is done - it was done with a speed and a brutality that schocked many Australians and Labor Party members. People woke up on Wednesday and travelled to work with barely any sense that by 9.30am the next day, their Verbose, Christian Queenslander would be removed from office and replaced with a left-wing, childless, unmarried, atheist, redheaded Victorian woman.
It's a spectacular amount of change in a very short period of time. I doubt even Gillard was expecting to be Prime Minister when she woke up on Wednesday. And yet, here she is. Australia's first female prime minister - and I truly believe she has the capacity to be of our greats. And the fact that she's all of those above things, to me, is a victory.
But despite the cause for celebration, you still get this lingering sense of discomfort at the way this all happened. It was too fast, too brutal, and too easy. Kevin Rudd led labor to one of its greatest ever election wins in 2007. Many Australians voted for Labor at the last election on the assumption that Rudd would lead the Labor party for a full term. In fact, when John Howard refused to serve a full term as Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd said he would. Expect to see those promises feature prominently in Liberal Party advertising within the next few months.
I'm sure it makes many Australians feel uncomfortable that a few factional powerbrokers and unions can remove a prime minister so quickly and with such devastating ease. Removing a Premier is one thing, but removing a Prime minister is quite another.
To understand how this all happened I think we need to rewind right back to the 2007 election and and go through the logical chain of events. Everything happens for a reason - even if it happens quickly. There have been warning signs for months, even years.
Rudd has a personal leadership style that was very grating to his colleagues. In 2007, he was seen as the saviour of Labor, and thus was granted unprecedented authority by his colleagues to do what he liked and to run his won agenda. For a while, it seemed to work. He said sorry to the stolen generation, made a cvonfident start on foreign policy, and when the financial crisis hit in late 2008, he gathered together his 3 most trusted ministers and made some very speedy and important decisions that saved Australia from the financial crisis.
But Rudd never had a personal power base of support deep within the party. And he alienated many of his colleagues by his "my way or the highway" style. He showed a sense of disinterest in many of his colleagues, some of whom were cabinet ministers. He didn't trust them wholeheartedly to make the right decisions. Very early on there were stories in the media that the entire government was effectively being run through Rudd's office - some only a few months after he was prime minister. He was described as all-knowing, all-controlling, and an authoritarian. Policy logjams were forming because everything had to go through his office. The staff turnover in his office demonstrates the incredible workload that he and his staff had to deal with.
As long as Rudd had the magic policy touch, he was going to be untouchable. During the financial crisis, he and his "gang of four" made some very effective and correct policy decisions on how to save the economy, through the bank guaruntee, to the stimulus packages, and the money spent building infrastructure. These good decisions brought calm, stability, and credibility to governmance in Australia. Rudd stayed very high, artificially one might argue, in the opinion polls.
But when he started making bad decisions, and when he started to go down in the polls, his automatic authority was always going to come into question. And when the chaos in his office started leading to poor policy or inadequate checking of decisions, like the insulation scheme, there was always going to be a push on to force Rudd to change his style.
The insulation scheme itself is a good example of where a little industry knowledge, (including asking unions and the industry), and a bit of proof-reading from colleagues might have made for a better designed scheme. There was nothing wrong with the idea - in fact it remains a very good one. But the design was poor, and was rushed into the implementation stage too quickly. There was a pressing need to do so but we now know it wouldn't have harmed the government or the country to spend a few weeks ironing out some of the kinks - with better consultation from cabinet and caucus, this could have occured.
This was a decision that was made in the heat of the moment. But despite that, and despite the financial situation calming down, the government continued with the same style of decision making. The seeds were there very early on for a sudden and dramatic downfall if something went haywire in Rudd's government.
I personally believe, however, that at any stage over the past 6 months, and even the past few weeks, the situation was salvageable. It should have been possible to save Kevin Rudd's leadership. But part of the problem was that Rudd got too used to acting like an autocrat - while he was making the right decisions, he was popular and everyone lived with it. But when things went wrong, everyone blamed Rudd - even though the failures were not solely his.
I personally believe that if the right political and policy choices were made 6 months ago, Rudd would still be sitting in the lodge right now, in his second term, with an emissions trading bill passed through parliament.
Six months ago, before the copenhagen conference, Rudd described Climate Change as "the greatest moral challenge of our time". People took him at his word, and it was reflected in his policy - a unilateral emissions cut in the absense of a global climate change deal, and a bigger cut if there was global agreement at copenhagen. I felt at the time that thiis was exactly right - establish it as soon as possible, then once in, it
To get his ETS through the senate, Rudd had to talk to the liberals. Getting an ETS passed without them was never going to fly, because the greens, xenophon and steven fielding were never going to agree on an ETS. Steve Fielding is a climate change denier and would not have voted for any ETS.
So the government attempted to negotiate with the liberals (the nationals were opposed). The negotiations were rocky, but Malcolm Turnbull had effectively reached an agreement. Unfortunately Turnbull suffered from the same problem as Rudd - he didn't consult his colleagues properly. It turned out that a majority of liberal MP's were climate skeptics or deniers - and when they realised this, they ripped Turnbull apart. Tony Abbott was unexpectedly made the liberal leader and dumped the ETS deal.
At this point, Rudd had too choices.
He could go to an early election in march (a double dissolution) and ram the ETS down the liberals throat.
Or he could stick to his earlier view that Australians will punish the government for going to an early election.
Rudd chose the latter option - his first mistake. The coalition would not have won an election in March, especially not under Abbott. The headlines for Abbott in March were mostly negative - although his soundbytes were getting traction, he was being trashed for his economic credibility in the media. Unfortunately for Rudd, around the same time the insulation scheme started blowing up, which spooked them away from an early election. They had to cancel the scheme.
then a number of other things happened. Firstly, the government reneged on a promise for child care centres. Two policy backflips started to put doubts in the minds of people.
The big hole was what to do about the emissions trading scheme. Apparently, sernior sections of the NSW Right faction, along with a few other senior figures (including Gillard), advised Rudd to delay the scheme until 2013. Rudd reluctantly took their advice - another big mistake. This was an enormous policy backflip that made him look like he didn't believe in anything, given his earlier comments.
He then signed a health deal without the agreement of Western Australia.
And finally, the Henry review was released. With so many cancelled policies, and Abbott running a completely obstructionist opposition, the government desperately flailed around for something to do. The government latched on to the recommendation to introduce a mining super profits tax. It seemed like a good idea - Australians would respond to the class warfare aspect of miners paying more tax, and the extra revenue would help pay off Australia's budget defecit.
This turned out to be a big mistake. Rudd and Swan knew this was going to cause a ruckus, and decided to break their promise on taxpayer funded advertising to shore up public support. It was a dumb decision and nobody at any stage advised against it. Rudd tried to strike in the dead of night by including the superprofits tax in the budget. The government dug a hole for itself and couldn't get out.
At any stage, Rudd could have tried a more consultative approach to the negotiations. But he didn't do so. he approached the mining companies the same way he approached his colleagues - he made the decisions around here, and he'll consult you after the decisions were made.
All of these decisions started piling up - and the polls kept going down. Although Labor was still about 52-48 on the 2PP votes in most newspolls, the damage was far worse and far more fundamental. The Primary vote was down to 35 percent - even with a high greens vote, that put labor in some serious trouble. The government itself was unable to function - with Rudd not consulting and unable to backflip further on policy. Nor could it get good messages out - an announcement on Paid Maternity leave was only in the media for 2 days before the mining ads took over again.
Unions started worrying that they had spent 11 years trying to get rid of John Howard and would then hand the reins back to Tony Abbott.
And then the fateful decisions were made by powerbrokers and unions - that Rudd had to go. When the end came, it came swiftly, with Rudd not being able to rely on any strong support within the party to keep his job. As a first term prime minister, this was pretty shocking.
It's important to remember that at any point during this 6-month period, it could have been different. If the right advice had been given, If Rudd changed his style, and if people stopped panicking and started fixing problems, the situation was retrievable. rudd would still have probably won the election, but the regrettable decision was made.
I think most Australians are now looking for a reason for the change. Does Gillard lead to an improvement in fortunes for Labor? My own feeling is that leadership change without policy change is political suicide. Gillard's first task is to fix up the mining tax - negotiate the details with the industry and get it done. They don't want those mining ads back on TV during the election, because they were killing labor.
They also will be looking to Gillard so she can prove that she's far more powerful than the people who put her there. This doesn't send a good look to the electorate, so they will be looking for a vote as soon as possible. If a mining tax deal is reached soon, Gillard will go to the polls, fix up labor's ETS policy during the campaign, and she'll win.
It's a spectacular amount of change in a very short period of time. I doubt even Gillard was expecting to be Prime Minister when she woke up on Wednesday. And yet, here she is. Australia's first female prime minister - and I truly believe she has the capacity to be of our greats. And the fact that she's all of those above things, to me, is a victory.
But despite the cause for celebration, you still get this lingering sense of discomfort at the way this all happened. It was too fast, too brutal, and too easy. Kevin Rudd led labor to one of its greatest ever election wins in 2007. Many Australians voted for Labor at the last election on the assumption that Rudd would lead the Labor party for a full term. In fact, when John Howard refused to serve a full term as Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd said he would. Expect to see those promises feature prominently in Liberal Party advertising within the next few months.
I'm sure it makes many Australians feel uncomfortable that a few factional powerbrokers and unions can remove a prime minister so quickly and with such devastating ease. Removing a Premier is one thing, but removing a Prime minister is quite another.
To understand how this all happened I think we need to rewind right back to the 2007 election and and go through the logical chain of events. Everything happens for a reason - even if it happens quickly. There have been warning signs for months, even years.
Rudd has a personal leadership style that was very grating to his colleagues. In 2007, he was seen as the saviour of Labor, and thus was granted unprecedented authority by his colleagues to do what he liked and to run his won agenda. For a while, it seemed to work. He said sorry to the stolen generation, made a cvonfident start on foreign policy, and when the financial crisis hit in late 2008, he gathered together his 3 most trusted ministers and made some very speedy and important decisions that saved Australia from the financial crisis.
But Rudd never had a personal power base of support deep within the party. And he alienated many of his colleagues by his "my way or the highway" style. He showed a sense of disinterest in many of his colleagues, some of whom were cabinet ministers. He didn't trust them wholeheartedly to make the right decisions. Very early on there were stories in the media that the entire government was effectively being run through Rudd's office - some only a few months after he was prime minister. He was described as all-knowing, all-controlling, and an authoritarian. Policy logjams were forming because everything had to go through his office. The staff turnover in his office demonstrates the incredible workload that he and his staff had to deal with.
As long as Rudd had the magic policy touch, he was going to be untouchable. During the financial crisis, he and his "gang of four" made some very effective and correct policy decisions on how to save the economy, through the bank guaruntee, to the stimulus packages, and the money spent building infrastructure. These good decisions brought calm, stability, and credibility to governmance in Australia. Rudd stayed very high, artificially one might argue, in the opinion polls.
But when he started making bad decisions, and when he started to go down in the polls, his automatic authority was always going to come into question. And when the chaos in his office started leading to poor policy or inadequate checking of decisions, like the insulation scheme, there was always going to be a push on to force Rudd to change his style.
The insulation scheme itself is a good example of where a little industry knowledge, (including asking unions and the industry), and a bit of proof-reading from colleagues might have made for a better designed scheme. There was nothing wrong with the idea - in fact it remains a very good one. But the design was poor, and was rushed into the implementation stage too quickly. There was a pressing need to do so but we now know it wouldn't have harmed the government or the country to spend a few weeks ironing out some of the kinks - with better consultation from cabinet and caucus, this could have occured.
This was a decision that was made in the heat of the moment. But despite that, and despite the financial situation calming down, the government continued with the same style of decision making. The seeds were there very early on for a sudden and dramatic downfall if something went haywire in Rudd's government.
I personally believe, however, that at any stage over the past 6 months, and even the past few weeks, the situation was salvageable. It should have been possible to save Kevin Rudd's leadership. But part of the problem was that Rudd got too used to acting like an autocrat - while he was making the right decisions, he was popular and everyone lived with it. But when things went wrong, everyone blamed Rudd - even though the failures were not solely his.
I personally believe that if the right political and policy choices were made 6 months ago, Rudd would still be sitting in the lodge right now, in his second term, with an emissions trading bill passed through parliament.
Six months ago, before the copenhagen conference, Rudd described Climate Change as "the greatest moral challenge of our time". People took him at his word, and it was reflected in his policy - a unilateral emissions cut in the absense of a global climate change deal, and a bigger cut if there was global agreement at copenhagen. I felt at the time that thiis was exactly right - establish it as soon as possible, then once in, it
To get his ETS through the senate, Rudd had to talk to the liberals. Getting an ETS passed without them was never going to fly, because the greens, xenophon and steven fielding were never going to agree on an ETS. Steve Fielding is a climate change denier and would not have voted for any ETS.
So the government attempted to negotiate with the liberals (the nationals were opposed). The negotiations were rocky, but Malcolm Turnbull had effectively reached an agreement. Unfortunately Turnbull suffered from the same problem as Rudd - he didn't consult his colleagues properly. It turned out that a majority of liberal MP's were climate skeptics or deniers - and when they realised this, they ripped Turnbull apart. Tony Abbott was unexpectedly made the liberal leader and dumped the ETS deal.
At this point, Rudd had too choices.
He could go to an early election in march (a double dissolution) and ram the ETS down the liberals throat.
Or he could stick to his earlier view that Australians will punish the government for going to an early election.
Rudd chose the latter option - his first mistake. The coalition would not have won an election in March, especially not under Abbott. The headlines for Abbott in March were mostly negative - although his soundbytes were getting traction, he was being trashed for his economic credibility in the media. Unfortunately for Rudd, around the same time the insulation scheme started blowing up, which spooked them away from an early election. They had to cancel the scheme.
then a number of other things happened. Firstly, the government reneged on a promise for child care centres. Two policy backflips started to put doubts in the minds of people.
The big hole was what to do about the emissions trading scheme. Apparently, sernior sections of the NSW Right faction, along with a few other senior figures (including Gillard), advised Rudd to delay the scheme until 2013. Rudd reluctantly took their advice - another big mistake. This was an enormous policy backflip that made him look like he didn't believe in anything, given his earlier comments.
He then signed a health deal without the agreement of Western Australia.
And finally, the Henry review was released. With so many cancelled policies, and Abbott running a completely obstructionist opposition, the government desperately flailed around for something to do. The government latched on to the recommendation to introduce a mining super profits tax. It seemed like a good idea - Australians would respond to the class warfare aspect of miners paying more tax, and the extra revenue would help pay off Australia's budget defecit.
This turned out to be a big mistake. Rudd and Swan knew this was going to cause a ruckus, and decided to break their promise on taxpayer funded advertising to shore up public support. It was a dumb decision and nobody at any stage advised against it. Rudd tried to strike in the dead of night by including the superprofits tax in the budget. The government dug a hole for itself and couldn't get out.
At any stage, Rudd could have tried a more consultative approach to the negotiations. But he didn't do so. he approached the mining companies the same way he approached his colleagues - he made the decisions around here, and he'll consult you after the decisions were made.
All of these decisions started piling up - and the polls kept going down. Although Labor was still about 52-48 on the 2PP votes in most newspolls, the damage was far worse and far more fundamental. The Primary vote was down to 35 percent - even with a high greens vote, that put labor in some serious trouble. The government itself was unable to function - with Rudd not consulting and unable to backflip further on policy. Nor could it get good messages out - an announcement on Paid Maternity leave was only in the media for 2 days before the mining ads took over again.
Unions started worrying that they had spent 11 years trying to get rid of John Howard and would then hand the reins back to Tony Abbott.
And then the fateful decisions were made by powerbrokers and unions - that Rudd had to go. When the end came, it came swiftly, with Rudd not being able to rely on any strong support within the party to keep his job. As a first term prime minister, this was pretty shocking.
It's important to remember that at any point during this 6-month period, it could have been different. If the right advice had been given, If Rudd changed his style, and if people stopped panicking and started fixing problems, the situation was retrievable. rudd would still have probably won the election, but the regrettable decision was made.
I think most Australians are now looking for a reason for the change. Does Gillard lead to an improvement in fortunes for Labor? My own feeling is that leadership change without policy change is political suicide. Gillard's first task is to fix up the mining tax - negotiate the details with the industry and get it done. They don't want those mining ads back on TV during the election, because they were killing labor.
They also will be looking to Gillard so she can prove that she's far more powerful than the people who put her there. This doesn't send a good look to the electorate, so they will be looking for a vote as soon as possible. If a mining tax deal is reached soon, Gillard will go to the polls, fix up labor's ETS policy during the campaign, and she'll win.
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